





Consciousness: Problems with Perspectives
Abstract
The paper deals with some misconceptions concerning ‘privileged’ (and at the same time 
‘mysterious’?) access to our own experiences from the first-person perspective, points to the 
limitations of this immediacy, and questions the solipsist privacy of subjectivity. Based on 
the conviction that the identification of ‘point of view’ with ‘perspective’ proves to be prob-
lematic, the author argues that we may take different perspectives from the same (person) 
point of view. As embodied and embedded cognitive persons we practice the interchange 
of perspectival attitudes towards our own subjectivity in our daily lives far more easily 
and frequently than we are prone to admit in our theories. This kind of methodology, part 
of which is also the objectivist third-person approach, does not have the power to revise 
the irreducibility between the subjective and the empirical, although it does appeal to the 
mind open to the intersubjective space, in which the irreducible can still be communicated, 




Introduction: Questioning the Questions
Any	current	attempt	to	define	consciousness	seems	to	be	doomed	to	excuses	
(i.e.	 today’s	 standard	 of	 scientific	 competence	 has	 not	 yet	 advanced	 suffi-
ciently	to	provide	us	with	the	final	knowledge	that	would	make	consciousness	
less	mysterious),	to	paradoxes	(i.e.	that	which	seems	to	be	the	most	intimate	
part	 of	our	 ‘self’	 proves	 to	be	 incredibly	difficult	 to	 access	 and	 report),	 to	
warnings	(i.e.	the	object	of	description	is	neither	single	nor	unified,	and	we	
actually	deal	with	multiple	 consciousnesses),	 to	doubts	 (whether	 empirical	
research	can	account	 for	 subjective	 feels),	 to	 speculations	 (whether	 silicon	
matter	can	ever	produce	consciousness),	etc.
The	 “mystery	 of	 consciousness”	 issues	 not	 only	 from	 the	 current	 inability	
to	provide	a	competent	and	complete	explanation	for	the	‘what’,	‘how’	and	
















within	 the	depths	 of	 privacy	 inaccessible	 not	 only	 to	 other	 minds	but	 also	
to	the	self-observing	mind.	Our	standard	theoretical	equipment	of	the	study	

























give	me	information	about	the	world	independent	of	myself	are	always	from	a	special point of 
view.	The	world	itself	has	no	point	of	view,	but	my	access	to	the	world	through	my	conscious	










experience,	 the	 latter	suggests	 that	objects	experience	 themselves	and	 their	
accessibility	to	the	conscious	mind.















2. The First-Person Perspective
The	‘first-person’	perspective	most	commonly	refers	to	our	lived	experience,	







A	 widespread	 fallacy	 is	 manifest	 in	 the	 conviction	 or	 expectation	 that	 the	
‘first-person’	modus	has	the	capacity	to	(almost	automatically)	reveal	what	is	
going	on,	both	personally	and	subpersonally,	in	the	conscious	world	of	each	
person.	 It	 is	believed	 that	whenever	we	switch	 to	 the	perspective	 from	 the	
“I”	point	of	view	a	cognitive	road	 is	opened	 to	unbiased	subjectivity;	 that,	
in	a	way,	it	is	this	very	immediacy	that	can	bring	us	to	what	can	be	consid-
ered	as	 the	consciously	 ‘given’:	 the	blueness	of	 the	sea,	 the	cry	of	a	baby,	

































it	seems	to	me	that	we	are	ignorant	of	the	fact	that	directness does not speak 



















“The	very	 fact	of	 subjectivity,	which	we	were	 trying	 to	observe,	makes	such	an	observation	
impossible.	Why?	Because	where	conscious	subjectivity	 is	concerned,	 there	 is	no	distinction	
between	 the	observation	and	 the	 thing	observed,	between	 the	perception	and	 the	object	per-












































and	 make	 this	 report	 partly	 re-shape	 the	 experiential	 status	 of	 my	 subjec-
tive	state.	Yet,	I	can	also	be	‘hurt’	in	that	I	experience	the	suffering	of	others	
(caused,	in	an	empathic	way,	through	interaction	with	a	‘second-person’).	
3. The Second-Person Perspective
One	of	 the	 implications	of	philosophy	having	affirmed	human	cognition	as	



















Contrary	 to	many	authors,	 that	 take	 them	as	
synonymous	(e.g.	Crane,	2001,	Ch.	2).
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tively	 interact	with	 surroundungs	 and	 ‘other	
minds’.
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Authors	 of	 the	 concept	 (Clark	 and	 Chalm-
ers…)	 advocate	 “active	 externalism”	 based	
























an	exclusively	 first-person	point	of	view,	cannot	 stand	before	one	 in	 this	way.”	 (Thompson,	
2001:	19)












not	 simply	 as	 a	 physical	 thing,	 but	 as	 a	 physical-thing-empathically-grasped-by-you-as-a-li-
ving-being.	In	other	words,	I	do	not	merely	experience	myself	as	a	sentient	being	‘from	within’,	










4. The Third-Person Perspective
Contemporary	literature	on	consciousness	quite	commonly	contrasts	the	first-






tured	by	a	 scientific	 investigation	of	 the	 latter	 (behaviour,	brain	processes,	















to	 ‘higher	 level’	 cognitive	processes	–	 as	 expressed	 in	 language	–	 shaping	


































as	 the	 third-person	methodology,	 then	 intimate	 reports	on	 subjective	 states	
























However,	 it	 can	 hardly	 be	 the	 case	 that	 we	 can	 ‘forget’	 what	 so	 naturally	
belongs	to	our	consciousness.	It	is	rather	the	other	way	round:	it	is	quite	dif-
ficult	to	see	how	the	‘purification’	procedures	should	succeed,	the	results	of	
which	would	 then	be	both	 isolated	qualitative	 states	 reduced	 to	qualia	and	
unspoiled	first-personness.	The	capacity	to	observe	ourselves	and	our	mental	
states	is	facilitated	not	only	by	introspection	and	other	modes	of	first-person	






















































































retical	 construct	 that	 works	 in	 our	 theories	

























a	neutral portrayal	of	exactly	what it is like to be that	subject	–	in	the	sub-
ject’s	 own	 terms,	 given	 the	 best	 interpretation	 we	 can	 master.”	 (1991:	 98;	
emphasis	by	Z.R.)	Such	a	“tactic	of	neutrality”	 is	believed	 to	 facilitate	 the	
empirically	based	science	of	consciousness	(83).
Dennett’s	 conception	 of	 heterophenomenology	 has	 been	 widely	 discussed,	
and	 the	questions	 that	 it	 raises	are	not	only	manifold	but	also	provocative.	
Yet,	 for	my	present	purposes,	 I	 shall	only	briefly	comment	on	 the	neutral-
ity	 of	 the	heterophenomenological	methodology	because	 it	 seems	 to	be	 an	
aspect	 that	comes	closest	 to	 the	 issue	at	hand	concerned	with	 the	possibil-
ity of	building	perspectives	on	consciousness.	Neither	Max	Velmans	(2001)	









































What	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 most	 intimate	 part	 of	 our	 ‘self’,	 i.e.	 consciousness,	
consciously	discloses	itself	on	the	interpersonal	level.




































It	 is	 difficult	 at	 this	 point	 not	 to	 recall	 a 
number	 of	 ironical	 remarks	 on	 the	 account	
of	behaviorism;	one	such	is:	First	behaviorist	
to	second	behaviorist	just	after	making	love:	














7. Consequences and Conclusions



























can	be	communicated	 beyond	 the	demarcation	 line	dividing	 the	 ‘first’	 from	
both	 the	 ‘second’	and	 the	 ‘third’	person	methodologies.	Moreover,	 they	can	
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Dieser Artikel befasst sich mit einigen falschen Auffassungen in Bezug auf ‘privilegierte’ (zu-
gleich aber auch ‘mysteriöse’) Zugänge zu eigenen Erfahrungen aus der Perspektive der ersten 
Person, verweist auf die Grenzen solcher Unmittelbarkeit und zweifelt am solipsistischen Ge-
heimnis der Subjektivität. Ausgehend von der Überzeugung, dass sich die Gleichstellung von 
‘Blickwinkel’ und ‘Perspektive’ als problematisch erwiesen hat, stellt der Verfasser die These 
auf, dass wir unterschiedliche Perspektiven aus ein und demselben (persönlichen) Blickwinkel 
haben können. Als gestaltgewordene, in die Umwelt eingebettete und erkenntnisfähige Personen 
praktizieren wir den Austausch perspektivistischer Standpunkte über die eigene Subjektivität in 
unserem Lebensalltag leichter und öfter, als wir dies in unseren Theorien zuzugeben bereit sind. 
Die Art der Methodologie, zu der auch der objektivistische Zugang der dritten Person gehört, 
ist außerstande, die Irreduktibilität zwischen dem Subjektiven und dem Empirischen zu revidie-
ren, setzt jedoch voraus, dass die Vernunft dem intersubjektiven Raum geöffnet ist, in dem das 





Conscience : le problème des perspectives
Résumé
L’article traite de certaines conceptions erronées liées à des approches « privilégiées » – et en 
même temps mystérieuses – des expériences autonomes à la première personne. Il souligne les 
limites d’une telle immédiateté et doute de l’intimité solipsiste de la subjectivité. En partant de 
la conviction selon laquelle l’identification du « point de vue » et de la « perspective » reste 
problématique, l’auteur affirme que nous pouvons avoir des perspectives différentes d’un même 
personnel point de vue personnel. En tant que personnes incarnées, intégrées et cognitives, nous 
pratiquons l’échange des attitudes perspectivistes face à notre propre subjectivité plus souvent 
et plus facilement dans notre quotidien que nous ne soyons prêts à l’admettre en théorie. La 
méthodologie qui correspond en partie à l’approche objectiviste de la troisième personne n’est 
pas en mesure de reconsidérer l’irréductibilité du subjectif et de l’empirique. Elle demande 
cependant un esprit ouvert à l’espace intersubjectif dans lequel l’irréductible peut encore se 
communiquer, se comparer et se compléter.
Mots-clés
conscience,	point	de	vue,	perspective	de	la première/seconde/troisième	personne,	subjectivité,	hété-
rophénoménologie,	intersubjectivité
